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Abstract 
 
Over the past three years, a significant part of the European Union Member States has recorded a real decline in the 
rely on policies of budgetary cuts as the only way to reach fiscal consolidation. The sudden decrease in aggregate demand 
and in public investments in the mid-term has led to economic contraction, higher taxation and a diminished potential for 
growth in most European economies. On this background, this paper aims at showing that fiscal consolidation must not 
exacerbate the policies to reduce the government spending or the discretionary use of budget deficits. The paper also 
intends to show that financial stability requires a mix of macroeconomic policies aimed at limiting the discretionary actions 
of political actors in budget spending structures. By doing so, it should lead towards a sustainable management of the fiscal 
space over the economic cycle in order to increase the number of fiscal stimuli with the best possible effects on economic 
growth. 
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1. Introduction 
After more than four years since the economic crisis has started, most of the European Union Member 
States are still facing excessive deficits, fast dynamics of public debt, higher interests and frozen credit 
markets. Despite the sudden economic downturn in the mid-2007 and the progressive deterioration of public 
finances, the European governments have been late in adopting strong policies to stimulate economic growth 
and to stabilize the fast decline of public finances. Only once the financing of budget deficits has become 
increasingly difficult and expensive, policies based on fastest budgetary adjustments through budget cutting 
measures were adopted. These decisions have instantaneously led to a decrease in aggregate demand and to a 
reduction in the public investments, on the short and medium term, and have led to an economic contraction, 
higher taxation and to a diminished potential growth for most European economies. It is quite true that when 
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the budgets are strongly imbalanced, strong policies should be quickly implemented, especially to relieve the 
distrust of the investors. Nonetheless, the budgetary imbalances are not exclusively the result of excessive 
spending, but also the consequence of lower budget revenues due to a decreasing of output. So, the European 
leaders have finally chosen to improve only one part of the balanced budget equation, using strong budget 
cutting policies, over the stipends, pensions or social allowances, in order to achieve the nominal criterion of 
the Stability and Growth Pact. It is true that in times of recession, the rough budgetary adjustments are 
unavoidable. But what mainly matters is the quality and not only the quantity of these adjustments. The limit of 
the bad qualitative adjustment will be reflected not only in disappointing economic results, but also in the high 
political and social risks that such measures usher. When the production and the aggregate demand are getting 
lower and lower, these could only be increased by higher government spending. But who can afford to spend 
more? States that before the recession have had a good management of public debt and have a reasonable fiscal 
space can borrow to spend more. For other countries whose indebtedness exceeds the threshold of 
sustainability, the solution can only arise from inside their borders. In the European Union, we meet both types 
of countries: countries that borrow easily and at low interest rates and states that cannot finance their deficits or 
refinance the huge public debts. Given that the European Central Bank cannot cover all the bonds rejected by 
the credit markets and would not yet, if ever, want to resort to unorthodox measures - the only option being in 
such case the consensus on the Euro common bonds. 
This paper is aiming at showing that: the bad adjustments in most European countries led neither to fiscal 
consolidation nor to a resumption of growth; the low qualitative budget cutting policies have determined a 
strong contraction not only of demand but also of output; that budget cutting policies without the stimulus for 
growth cannot be over the long run efficient, but instead can drive economies to the negative spiral of growth; 
that the increase of spending in recession is one of the most useful tools, but only in certain conditions. To 
prove these hypotheses, we first intend to review the main theories and researches that have focuses over the 
years on the rational use of budget deficit over the economic cycle and on how adjustments could be made 
during recession. We also intend to demonstrate that fiscal adjustments through budget cutting have led to the 
contraction of aggregate demand and of real output and to increasing taxes, particularly in the states with the 
biggest imbalances in the public finances. We would also want to show that, even in the absence of a European 
common fiscal policy, the issue of common bonds in the EMU and even in the EU can make financial 
resources available for financing deficit and for growth, while addressing the fears of moral hazard.  
 
2 The theoretical background 
 
Since the earlier manifestations of the economics as an independent science, the budget deficits were not 
seen at all as a positive tool, mainly due to the possible irrational use of borrowed resources and to the fiscal 
illusion that governments can give to their citizens. Especially after World War II, the need for a "safety belt" 
in case of temporary economic shocks such as natural disasters, military conflicts or cyclical economic declines 
was understood and thus the demonization of deficits was qualified. All the theories outlined over the years 
converge in the assessment that it is really easy to increase the government spending, however possible 
adjustments in case of economic downturn are  on the contrary - achieved with great difficulty. 
The early theories  
David Ricardo, for example, considers the debt caused by budget deficits as one of the most terrible 
scourges that was ever invented , which can affect a nation with devastating effects (Ricardo, 1871). He 
considered as an option that governments tend to be far less sensitive than if it were based solely on their own 
resources and make governments to ignore the real economic situation. Ricardo feared that citizen wrong that 
would be as rich as before then will face higher taxes to pay for debt and faced with the tax burden would be 
tempted to move the capital from his country to another country that will be discharged from such burden. 
Adam Smith argued that the debt and associated costs could deprive society of resources that could be invested 
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in a more productive way and, beyond a certain level of debt, the state would not be able to sustainable manage 
it and there is also the risk that the national bankruptcy could appear Smith, 1776. Jean Baptiste Say believes 
that large deficits allow governments to design giant public projects that the market cannot deliver, sometimes 
causing disgrace, sometimes bringing glory, but always leading to the financial exhaustion of the state Say, 
1853. Arthur Cecil Pigou, one of the economists who believed that a well-organized economy must be able to 
cover their ordinary expenses through taxes, had to admit eventually that exceptions may be accepted if some 
natural disaster or war may affect the ability of the "fiscal machinery" of the government to collect taxes from 
the economy. Also, Pigou would open the way for exceptions to budget deficits in cases of public investments: 
"loans made for the accumulation or production of capital goods cannot be seen as dangerous."(Pigou, 1929) 
The European economic context of the last decade has confirmed the earlier fears of the classical economists, 
reflected in the creation of excessive deficits determined by the ordinary costs of oversized social programs and 
less investment spending with high multiplier effects in the economy. For this reason, in particular, the 
European leaders have opted for a paradigm of balanced budgets, losing sight of the need for higher economic 
growth of the new Member States, based on growth-oriented public investment budget deficits.  
Deficits, fiscal consolidation and political distortions 
After the Maastricht Treaty, the stability of public finances was the central concern of most governments of 
the Member States of the European Union in order to achieve nominal convergence objectives and ensure 
harmonious development of the states participating in the EMU. The pressure of the budget deficits and of the 
increasing debt has become the major concern of European countries faced with this type of imbalance. Despite 
the manifest signals of slowing down, no tangible action has been taken by European leaders to limit financial 
vulnerability. The economic actions ought to be reflected in adjustments to increase public spending and budget 
transfers, in the rigid limits of growth and by taking into account other economic factors such as inflation, real 
growth of the GDP, the labor productivity or external competitiveness. It is easy to predict that politicians in 
whose hands such decisions lay are unlikely to push forward measures that could affect the short-term election 
objectives. Promoting the budget deficits will certainly produce some welfare effects on the short and very 
short term, but can affect disinflation and growth potential on medium and long term, especially if the deficit is 
only intended to stimulate domestic consumption. It is also hard to believe that in the absence of strong legal, 
institutional or supranational constraints, the governments would use voluntary adjustments needed to restore 
the budgetary balance. Since the '70s, Buchanan and Wagner have warned about the possibility of such 
developments. They have seen the policies of budget deficits as the outcome of a relationship between 
opportunistic politicians and naive voters, deceived by fiscal illusion. Voters will invariably be in favor of 
increasing the public spending in order to upgrade their own welfare, but would not want to pay for this 
increase ever. On the other hand, voters do not have the information necessary to understand the budgetary 
constraints that the government may face over the time, which is why politicians take advantage of this and 
promote voluntary deficits to winning elections Buchanan &Wagner, 2000. The shorter electoral cycles do not 
overlap with the economic cycles, and so the new governments are unlikely to benefit from the effects of 
expansionary budgetary policies of previous governments, and are forced to adjust the budget through tight 
policies. There are scholars who have tried to determine whether budgetary discipline is influenced by the 
structure or ideological orientation of the governing parties. For example, Alesina and Perotti have empirically 
shown that while coalition governments and minority governments have the greatest tendencies to promote 
highly restrictive fiscal policies, the coalition governments have the lowest efficiency in achieving this 
objective. The most effective type of government is a single-party or a minority government. Also, depending 
on the ideological orientation, the center-left governments seem to be the most effective in achieving restrictive 
fiscal policies, while the opposite is true for the governments of the center, which are usually cross-party 
coalition governments of left and right-wing parties. We should not ignore that in the current economic crisis, 
European the ideological hypothesis seems to be reversed: the center-right governments have promoted strong 
fiscal consolidation and restrictive budgetary policies. However, it is still premature to assess the effectiveness 
of these measures. In this context, Poterba considers that the adoption of a strict budgetary rule like the 
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balanced budget  rule can be the only way to limit the discretion of political actors on the public resources. A 
restrictive rule of this type should provide a form of "self-control" Poterba, 1996 for politicians who are always 
tempted to abandon the deficit target under the social pressures.  
Poterba is in line with economists who believe that budget deficits and fiscal imbalances are solely the 
result of the distortions coming from the political arena. Politicians are always tempted to make the government 
spend on projects over the capacity of the national economy to fund it. Not incidentally, the United States and 
the European Union through the Fiscal Compact adopted in Brussels on March 2, 2012 chose to introduce a 
strict budget rule into their constitutions. However, U.S. experience shows that the inclusion of budgetary 
restrictions in national constitutions, just to strait-lace the , was and still is greatly 
overestimated.  
This skepticism is embraced by James Buchanan who states that in the U.S., the budget equilibrium has 
been maintained thanks to the attitude of governments on fiscal policies, without any amendment to provide for 
this, but the budget equilibrium was lost just after the adoption of balanced budget  amendment Buchanan, 
1997. 
Budget cuts, spending more or both? 
Robert Barro has proven that the imbalances in the public finances will, sooner or later, lead to higher taxes 
and to a reduction of the potential output. Barro admitted that there is also the alternative of the limitation or of 
the adjustments of government spending, which will also result in contractions on production (Barro, 1979). In 
times of recession, the Keynesian model recommends not budget cuts but rather tax reductions - no deficit 
reduction, but rather an increase in spending as the only way to stimulate the aggregate demand.  
Paul Krugman, who constantly rejected the policy of reductions in government spending and investment in 
time of recession, based his argument on strong contractionary effects that these cuts would cause. Krugman's 
categorical views summarized in "Spend more to fix economy! It's Really That Simple " Krugman, 2012 should 
be related to fiscal space that gives states the right to spend more in the recession. In fact, the struggle for 
financial resources is not only a struggle for funding deficits but also a struggle to finance government 
spending that could stimulate economic growth recovery. Also, when the debt reaches extremely high values 
and a stabilization program should be implemented to decrease the fiscal deficit, contractionary effects can 
happen on consumer spending as well Sutherland, 1997.  
It should be noted that a strong fiscal position, complete and long-term growth prospects, prevent the 
crowding-out effect on production in times of recession, and the potential transfer of wealth to foreign 
creditors. Meade feared that external debt will become a burden to the community that contracts, because it 
produces real goods and services transfers between debtor and creditor, while domestic debt is a transfer from 
citizens, as taxpayers, to citizen owners and thus no loss of any kind. Meade estimated losses related to interest 
rates that distressed borrowers are willing to pay foreign creditors and sometimes can reach substantial levels, 
stopping governments to use for other policies such as education, defense or investment public. 
A median view is represented by Balassone and Franco who recommend that a budgetary distinction 
between ordinary expenses and capital expenditures must be made. This different view, which propose that the 
budget for regular expenses must be in balance or in surplus, and which accepts that the budget for public 
investments and capital accumulation can operate with deficits Balassone&Franco, 2001, is in fact the budget 
policy that found practical application into the 
which was later abandoned as the abdication from the principles of public investments.  
Different views 
Other economists consider that the focus of the European financial stability should be put on the public 
debt to GDP ratio and not on the potential restriction of budget deficits for example, Pisani-Ferry, 2002, while 
other minimizes budget control efficiency as a fiscal rule in the European Monetary Union and considers that 
the delegation of fiscal powers to an independent fiscal commission for coordination of both fiscal and 
monetary policies would be much more efficient Wyplosz, 2002.  
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3 The adjustments through the budget cutting policies 
 
In order to analyze and to test our hypothesis, we have selected those Member States from the EU27 who 
have experienced the strongest public finance imbalances: Greece, Spain, Italy, Hungary, and a new member 
state, Romania. For the selected group of five countries, three members and two non-members of the Eurozone, 
we have analyzed the main policies implemented in order to adjust the high budgetary imbalances.  As 
governments wanted to quickly and significantly reduce the gap between revenues and expenditures in the 
public domain, the most common adjustments were focused on reductions 
or freeze, the resize of social support or the decrease of the transfers from the central government to the public 
administrations.  
Main adjustments and their effects  
Countries/ 
Measures/ 
Effects 
Total Gov. 
Revenues* 
(*Eurostat) 
Adjustments through budget cuts 
Wages/Pensions/Social/Transfers 
Increase 
of the tax 
Political 
governments 
Fall 
Social 
disapproval 
Greece In 2011 
returned to 
the 2007 
level 40.8% 
of GDP 
- 22% public 
wages cuts 
- 12% 
public 
pensions 
cuts 
- 200.000 less 
social 
allowances 
- 10% 
increase of 
VAT  
- new other 
taxes 
- two 
governments 
fall 
(Papandreou; 
Papademos)  
- strong social 
turbulences 
- higher  
unemployment 
Spain Decrease 
from 41,1% 
of GDP in 
2007 to 
35.1% of 
GDP in 2011 
- 5% public 
wages cuts 
and freezing  
- abolition of 
public 
bonuses 
 
- freezing 
public 
pensions 
 
- reduced the 
unemployment 
benefits 
- redesigning 
the social 
allowances 
- two 
successive  
increase of 
VAT 2% 
and 
respectively 
3% 
-  
- Zapatero 
government was 
replaced by 
Rajoy 
- moderate 
social 
turbulences 
- strong 
unemployment 
Italy  Remains 
relatively 
constant at 
46% of GDP 
- 
redundancies 
in public 
administration 
- freezing 
public 
pensions 
 
- lower health 
spending and 
cuts for 
transfers to the 
public 
administrations 
- 2% 
increase of 
VAT from 
October 
2012  
- Berlusconi 
government was 
replaced by a 
technocratic 
(Monti) 
- frequent 
strikes  
- low 
unemployment 
Hungary Grew 
strongly in 
2011 from 
45.2% of 
GDP to up to 
53% 
- public 
wages cuts 
- public 
pensions 
cuts 
- 
increasing 
the 
retirement 
age 
- social 
allowances 
cuts 
- increase of 
VAT from 
25% to 
27%, 
highest in 
EU 
- tax on 
financial 
transactions  
- Bajnai 
government was 
replaced by 
Orban 
- strikes 
- moderate 
unemployment 
Romania Decrease 
from 35.3% 
of GDP in 
2007 to 
32.5% of 
GDP in 2011 
- 25% public 
wages cuts 
- natural 
redundancies 
in public 
administration 
- freezing 
public 
pensions 
- 
increasing 
the 
retirement 
age 
- redesigning 
the social 
allowances  
- lower transfer 
to local 
administrations 
- 5% 
increase of 
VAT  
- new other 
taxes on 
capital or 
labor 
- two Romanian 
governments 
fall in 2012 
(Boc; 
Ungureanu) 
- moderate 
social unrests 
- low 
unemployment 
Data sources: Eurostat and Public Finance Ministries of assessed States 
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It is easy to notice that cutting policies have not led to the desirable budget equilibrium but rather to the 
reduction of private consumption which caused a decrease of aggregate demand and the break down of real 
government revenues. Scared of these consequences, the governments have wrongly chosen the increase of 
taxation, thus stimulating the fiscal evasion and the spiral of increasing the taxation. The effects were not only 
on the economy, but also on the society and politics. All governments that have taken such measures have 
sooner or later lost the social and political support. Political and social risks have risen almost instantaneously 
materializing in governmental instability, distrust and in social protests against the major welfare losses.    
Without any doubt, the worst effects were reflected in the reduction of potential output growth. All these 
countries and others as well have experienced a strong GDP contraction just after the implementation of these 
measures, and the out of the recession was rapidly followed by very low rates of growth and by re-entry into 
recession. The reasons for such economic contractions are relatively obvious. We can easily observe the impact 
of the first wave of public cuts in the late 2008 and the second one in the middle of 2012. On the one side, the 
aggregate demand was frozen or decreased following the depreciation of purchasing power. On the other hand, 
the financial resources for stimulating growth especially through the public investments were absent and no 
action has been taken to find them. 
 
The crash of real GDP due to budget cutting policies 2008-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data source: Eurostat 
 
In this context, in which we have argued that the difficulties in financing a higher demand and in 
stimulating growth can be avoided by the emission of collective bonds, we will use a very simple simulation 
with two countries, A and B. A is the country with a massive public debt and excessive deficits, which has to 
pay huge interests for financing them. On the contrary, B easily finds funds and at low interests rate. Joining 
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Carstensen, 2011. Also, both A and B can obtain a considerable reduction of bond yields. The moral hazard 
associated with the common bonds can be countered by a redistribution mechanism of advantages between 
Member States. The common bonds would provide all participating Member States with more secure access to 
financing and refinancing, preventing a sudden loss of market access due to unwarranted risk aversion or herd 
behaviour among investors. This kind of bonds would help to smooth market volatility and reduce or eliminate 
the need for costly support and rescue measures for Member States temporarily excluded from market 
financing. The positive effects of such bonds are dependent on managing the potential disincentives for fiscal 
discipline. 
Common bonds scenario 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
It is obvious that European countries need today more than ever a restoration of the fiscal discipline and a 
regain of the global credit market trust. But the fiscal consolidation policy should be improved with specific 
provisions containing differentiated 
of public pensions requested by the expected budgetary consequences of population ageing in the next decades, 
the reform of public services, the improvement of local budgets and the decentralization of administration 
cannot be achieved instantly. Unfortunately, the budget cutting policies adopted by European countries were 
put in place only to balance the public budget, but they did not pay any attention to the optimal structure of 
public expenditures or to their appropriateness and efficiency. Also, the fiscal consolidation target should not to 
be a public debt tending towards zero, but in the first instance its stabilization and then the gradual reduction to 
a moderate level which would not have any adverse effects on growth. The abrupt budget adjustment would 
also seriously affect the catching up objectives for the new Member States, like Hungary and Romania.  
Knowing that the economic disparities between EU15 and the new Member States are still significant, the 
next fiscal measures that aim at the financial stability should also respond to the needs of catching up. The 
catching up process must be based on a higher rate of economic growth rather than on the average growth of 
the most developed economies of European Union. Perhaps the harshest lesson of budget cutting policies 
adopted in the last years is that the fiscal consolidation cannot be reached without policies for growth. Also, the 
quality of cuts is more important than the quantity on the long run, especially for growth.  
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